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Abstract
Textual passwords have dominated all other entity authentication mechanisms since
they were introduced in the early 1960’s. Despite an inherent weakness against social
engineering, keylogging, shoulder surfing, dictionary, and brute-force attacks, password
authentication continues to grow as the Internet expands. Existing research on password
authentication proves that dictionary attacks are successful because users make poor choices
when creating passwords. To make passwords easier to remember, users select character
strings that are shorter in length and contain memorable content, like personal identity
information, common words found in a dictionary, backward spellings of common words,
recognizable sequences, and easily guessed mnemonic phrases.
A number of these studies identify weaknesses found in passwords on social media
sites [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]. However, this body of work fails to explore whether users choose
more secure passwords on accounts that protect their professional online identity than they
choose on accounts that are used for personal entertainment. In this study, we first cracked
passwords from the over 6.4 million unsalted, SHA-1 hashed passwords stolen from the
professional, social media site, LinkedIn. Next, we analyzed the length, character set
composition, and entropy score of the passwords recovered. Then, we compared our results
to the analysis of passwords performed by Weir, et al. on the RockYou! dataset to determine
whether professionals protecting their online presence chose wiser passwords than social
media site users who play online games.
In our analysis we found that the users of the professional, social media site,
LinkedIn, chose more secure passwords than the users of the social media gaming site,
RockYou!. LinkedIn passwords contained a greater percentage of numbers, special
characters, and uppercase letters than RockYou!. We also found that the LinkedIn
viii

passwords utilized special characters more frequently, but RockYou! passwords applied
special character less predictably.
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Chapter 1

Overview

Introduction

Entity authentication is the process of confirming the identity of an individual and in
modern computing the most common method of performing authentication is through a
text-based password. A three month study involving one half of a million users found that
the average user owns roughly twenty-five accounts that require typing a password, and the
user types about eight passwords a day [6]. Given the popularity of text-based
authentication and the number of recent password attacks aimed at government facilities [7],
web portals [8], social media networks [3], and gaming sites [5], it is understandable why
protecting password-based systems is a major concern in the security industry.
Entity Authentication
Although password authentication dominates other forms of authentication, it is not
the only method of authentication available. Computer applications authenticate a user’s
identity with three different methods: what the individual knows, what the individual
physically possesses, and what physical characteristics make up the individual. Password
authentication falls into the first category, what the individual knows. From a security
perspective what an individual possesses, a token, and the physical characteristics which
make up the individual, biometrics, store longer keys which contain more randomness than
human beings can remember. The recommended RSA key size stored on a token is 256
characters, or 2048 bits [9], while an average person only remembers approximately seven
characters of random data or 56 bits [10].
However, token-based authentication requires that the user possess the object in
order to be recognized. If the token is not in the user’s possession, authentication cannot
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occur. A threat of being lost or stolen also exists. For this reason many token-based
systems also require a pass code, which might be forgotten. Biometrics avoid the problems
of tokens. Since physical characteristics travel with a person, biometrics cannot be lost,
stolen or left somewhere. However biometric readings may differ from the authentication
database due to injury, clothing, background noise, illness, and age. Biometrics, which stores
attributes of a person’s physical being, also raise privacy concerns for individuals who resist
technology, and biometrics cannot be revoked easily.
The greatest drawback of using either token-based or biometric authentication is cost
and ease of configuration. Both tokens and biometrics require hardware and software to act
as an intermediary between the token reader / biometric reader and the system to which the
user is being authenticated. Tokens and biometrics require an initial setup period and
troubleshooting is more complex.
The disadvantages of using token based and biometric authentication do not apply to
knowledge based authentication. Text-based passwords require no special hardware and
travel well. They provide cost effective authentication, which is not susceptible to bad
readings or changes in a person’s physical characteristics. They are not likely to spawn a
debate on privacy issues and can be easily revoked. Password based authentication also
enables the users to manage their own accounts without the intervention of a system
administrator. For these reasons, it is the preferred choice for access to email, social media,
online banking, medical information, student records, credit card data, gaming, and web
portal accounts.
Password Authentication
Password-based authentication relies on a challenge-response system of verification.
In the most basic form, an authentication server sends the client a request (the challenge) to

3
provide a password, and the client replies (responds) with the password. The server checks
the password against a database of passwords for different users and authenticates the user if
the account and passwords match. The inherent problem with storing plaintext passwords
in the database file is that anyone with access to the file can read the contents, regardless of
whether they have legitimate rights to read the file or not. To correct this flaw, secure
authentication servers store passwords in an “encrypted” format.
Most modern implementations of password encryption involve cryptographic
hashing algorithms. A cryptographic hashing algorithm transforms plain text of variable
length to a fixed length hash using a one way function. The computation to create the hash
from the plaintext is easy, but retrieving the password from the hash value should be
extremely difficult. Effective cryptographic hashing algorithms should also resist collisions
which occur when two known plaintext values are hashed to the same hash value. It is
important to note that authentication servers never decrypt hashes. The servers simply
compare the hashed password sent from the client to the hashed value in the password
database.
With the appropriate systematic methods in place the security of password
authentication relies on the user’s choices when selecting a password. Stated another way, in
secure systems, the length and predictability of the password that a user chooses determines
the success or failure of an attack. Many factors determine the choices users make when
selecting a password: The ease of typing, value of the asset being protected, memorability,
and knowledge of creating secure passwords all determine how the user chooses a password.
Despite the amount of research performed in understanding password choices, there
is no definitive answer to the question “Do users select stronger passwords to protect
accounts that store valuable information than they select for accounts that provide
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entertainment?” In this paper we will focus on the value of the asset being protected by a
password. We will attempt to reveal and analyze passwords from the approximately 6.5
million hashes stolen from the professional social media site, LinkedIn. According to
reports from Sophos Security, the SHA1 hashed password appeared on a Russian hacking
web in June 2012 following the breach [11]. In this analysis we will compare our findings to
passwords from the online social gaming site, RockYou! to determine whether the value of
the information being protected plays a role in the level of password security.

Problem Statement
This research attempts to answer the following questions:
1. What are the strengths and weaknesses of passwords which protect
professional social media accounts, like LinkedIn, with respect to their length
and character composition?
2. Do the accounts of professional social media sites, like LinkedIn, possess
more complex passwords than accounts used for personal entertainment, like
RockYou!?

Contributions
The results of this thesis research are two folded
1. We recovered 2,732,643 plaintext passwords from the SHA1 hashed
LinkedIn dataset. Our research produced the largest number of passwords
studied from a cracked dataset.
2. We analyzed the passwords and found that the passwords used on the
professional, social media site LinkedIn possess greater complexity than the
RockYou! passwords used to access games on social media sites.

5

Organization
The remainder of this thesis shall be organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives some
background information and related work. Chapter 3 describes how we obtained plaintext
passwords from the LinkedIn dataset. Chapter 4 provides the details of our analysis.
Concluding remarks appear in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 2
Background Information and Related Work

History of text based authentication
Password authentication emerged in modern computing in 1961 on the MIT
campus. System administrators needed a method for limiting the computing time granted to
each student accessing the Compatible Time-Sharing System (CTSS), and they created the
first user accounts protected by text-based passwords [12]. One year later, Allan Scherr, a
PhD candidate needing more computing time than the four hours per semester allotted to
each student, submitted a print request for a file named “UACCNT.SECRET”. The
printout which appeared in Scherr’s mailbox the following day contained a list of usernames
and passwords which he exploited to gain more access time and complete his thesis work.
Scherr’s activities demonstrate that attempts to undermine password security have existed
since the earliest attempt to protect a computer’s assets with passwords. Scherr’s password
authentication malfeasance also begins a history of attempts to subvert text based password
protection, including not only the unauthorized access of password databases, but also
phishing, SQL injection, and dictionary, rainbow table, and brute force attacks. As attacking
methods improve, so must the understanding of the forces which drive password choices
and the policies which contribute to more secure authentication.
Research on password evaluation falls into two categories: studies of length and
composition and studies of guessing. Studies which utilize length and composition metrics
analyze a password’s strength by identifying the number of characters and the type of
characters chosen. The type of characters may be numeric, alphabetic upper case, alphabetic
lower case, special characters, and foreign/other characters. In contrast, studies which
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incorporate guessing metrics aim to determine the likelihood of an attacker successfully
recovering a password.

Historical evaluation of length and composition research
In an attempt to plug the largest security hole opened by text based authentication,
numerous researchers have analyzed password length and composition characteristics
attempting to determine their level of security and to improve their effectiveness. Morris and
Thompson’s [13] seminal study in 1979 discovered that 71% of the passwords cracked
contained either short passwords (less than five characters) or all lowercase or all uppercase
for longer passwords (5 or 6 letters). They concluded
“Given free choice, most people will choose their passwords from a
restricted character set (e.g. all lower case letters) and will often choose words
or names.” [13]
Their findings reveal a fundamental component of human nature; people want easy. By
choosing passwords containing easy to type and easy to remember character strings, people
gain access quickly and remember their credentials each time they login.
Every study which followed Morris and Thompson’s paper echoes their findings
regarding easily typed passwords. Spafford’s 1991 study which collected passwords on 54
machines at the Department of Computer Sciences and the Computing Center found that
the average length of unique passwords was 6.8 characters with 60.6% of the passwords
containing all lowercase letters or all numeric characters. Wu, using a dictionary attack of
passwords on a Kerberos realm in 1999, found 84.5 % of the passwords contained eight
characters or less and 86% of the passwords could be typed without the Shift key [14]. In a
more recent study from 2010, Devillers found that, in the RockYou! dataset, most of the
passwords fell between six and eight characters. Lowercase only, digit only, and lowercase
and digit passwords accounted for 91% of the passwords analyzed [2].
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With respect to the factors of memorability, research also matches Morris and
Thompson’s findings that users will chose words and names rather than random character
strings. A study by Riddle et al in 1989 categorized 6226 passwords based on their content,
such as names, words, and random strings [15]. Like Riddle, Cazier and Medlin classified
passwords based on content in their study of an e-business site with no password policy.
Using a five grade scale with obvious names and numbers at the bottom of the scale and
unrecognizable strings alphabetic, numeric, and special characters at the top, their research
found that the mean of passwords fell below the midpoint of the scale [16]. Words and
names are used so frequently in password selection that one psychologist called passwords
“a 21st century Rorschach inkblot test” [17], because people choose password based on
thoughts just below the subconscious, and these thoughts may possess an emotional
component which make them easier to remember.
Other research proves that even when words are not used, memorability drives
password choice. Kuo, et al., studied the mnemonic devices used to create passwords from
memorable phrases. The team collected phrases based on Google searches of nursery
rhymes, advertising slogans, television theme songs, and other memorable quotes. The
400,000 entry word list which they generated, based on a letter, number, or special character
representing each word in the phrase, cracked 4% of the phrase based passwords collected
[18]. In 2005, Narayanan and Shmatikov proved that the distribution of common passwords
is consistent with the distribution of letters in the users’ native language and launched a
dictionary attack based on this model which recovered 67.6% of the passwords attempted
[19].
Although research confirms that users select convenient and memorable passwords,
only a few conflicting studies exist that compare password choices and demographics. Most
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notably, Medlin and Cazier found that males logging onto an e-commerce site chose more
complex passwords than their female counterparts [20]. They suggest that this difference
may have resulted from the larger number of males in the workforce, where employers
provide secure password training and enforcement. Bonneau’s analysis of data on nearly 70
million Yahoo! passwords found the opposite to be true. With regard to demographic
factors, like culture, gender, and race, password distributions remained consistent with
respect to all of the various subpopulations. [21]

Historical evaluation of guessing metrics
Claude Shannon’s groundbreaking work for Bell Laboratories [22] provides a starting
point for another method for evaluating passwords, guessing metrics. Prior to Shannon’s
work, the definition of information was based largely on the work of Kant who defined
information as a subjective reality perceived by the senses and assigned meaning by the mind
[23]. Shannon’s work focused not on the meaning or significance of information, but on the
encoding and transmission of a message through a given channel. This perspective
reinterpreted information as objective and quantifiable. “Entropy”, the term Shannon gave
to the amount of information gained (or the amount of uncertainty reduced), could be
measured through a sequence of probabilities involving the symbols (i.e. letters, numbers,
and punctuation) used to encode a message. The equation for entropy, H, can be
determined for a discrete, random variable x using the calculation:
Equation 1: Shannon entropy
𝑛

𝐻 (𝑥 ) = − ∑ 𝑃(𝑥)𝑖 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 𝑃(𝑥)𝑖
𝑖

where each variable (x1, x2, x3,…xn) in the set of X possesses a probable outcome (p1, p2,
p3,…pn) in the distribution. As an example, if we wish to determine the information gained
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by flipping a coin, we can represent 𝑥𝐻 as landing on heads and 𝑥 𝑇 as landing on tails and
the entropy calculation becomes H(x) = −(𝑃(𝑥 )𝐻 log2 𝑃(𝑥 )𝐻 + 𝑃(𝑥 ) 𝑇 log2 𝑃(𝑥 )𝑇 ). If
the coin has an even chance of landing on head as tails then 𝑃(𝑥)𝐻 equals 50% and 𝑃(𝑥) 𝑇 ,
equals 50% By inserting these values into the equation, H(x) =
−((. 5)log 2 (.5)+ (. 5)log 2 (.5)), a single coin flip results in 1 bit of information.
Although the entropy equation calculates the resources required to store or transmit
hashed passwords, the calculation fails to provide a metric for determining the vulnerability
of a system or the ease of guessing a password. A 2006 NIST publication adds ambiguity to
the term entropy by redefining the word as a metric for measuring password complexity not
the amount of information gained or the guessing difficulty. Rather than incorrectly attempt
to determine the number of guesses required to by an attacker to uncover a password using
Shannon’s entropy or the NIST publication’s entropy, the metric guessing entropy was
introduced [24]. To compute the average number of guesses required to determine the value
of X employing an optimal guessing strategy, the equation would be:
Equation 2: Guessing entropy
𝑛

𝐸 [𝐺(𝑋)] = ∑ 𝑖 ∙ 𝑝𝑖
𝑖=1

Another useful guessing model presented by Botzaş [25] simulates a real world attacker’s
strategy by limiting the number of guesses to 𝛽 per appears in the equation:
Equation 3: Botzaş guessing success rate
𝛽

𝜆𝛽 (𝑋) = ∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑖=1
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Pliam also simulates a real world attacker’s approach to uncovering passwords by not trying
to guess every account, but instead to crack a predetermined proportion of the accounts, 𝛼,
using the equation:
Equation 4: Pliam guessing proportion
j
𝜇𝛼 (𝑋) = min{j| ∑i=1 𝑝i ≥ α}
Bonneau combines Botzaş and Pliam’s work and shows an attacker limiting the number of
guesses and stopping early if a desired number of accounts have been cracked as shown in
the calculation:
Equation 5: Bonneau guessing early termination
𝜇𝛼

𝐺𝛼 (𝑋) = (1 − 𝜆𝜇𝛼 ) ∙ 𝜇𝛼 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖 ∙ 𝑖
𝑖=1
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Chapter 3
The LinkedIn Dataset and Password Recovery Methods
The LinkedIn dataset will be used in this study, and it contains 6,458,020 SHA1hashed passwords stored in a Password Verification Data (PVD) file. The PVD file includes
2,936,840 unaltered, SHA1 hashed passwords and 3,521,180 SHA1 hashes in which the
leading five characters of the hash have been replaced by zeroes. The SHA1 hashes of many
common passwords, like “password”, “linkedin”, “123456” match hashes in the leading
zeroes list when the first five characters are replaced with zeros. For this reason, it has been
postulated that the zero-leading hash list contains the passwords which have already been
cracked by tagging the first five characters with a zero in place of the actual characters.
We began our analysis by separating the PVD file into two groups: the straight SHA1
hashes and the zero-leading SHA1 hashes. We searched each list individually for duplicates
and found none, so we started the process of cracking passwords. First we engaged in a
rainbow table attack using rcracki_mt software [26]. Since the zero-leading SHA1 list
represents altered hashes, traditional SHA1 cracking tools, like rcraki_mt, would not work
with this list. We subjected only the straight SHA1 password list to the rainbow table attack.
The key space for this attack consisted of one to seven characters with all combinations of
uppercase letters [A-Z], lowercase letters [a-z], and digits [0-9]. Due to the resource
intensive nature of rainbow table cracking, we divided the straight SHA1 hashes into smaller
files containing between one thousand and five thousand hashes. These files were cracked
distributively on twenty different machines on campus at James Madison University over the
course of eight months.
Computer Science classes on-campus utilize lab workstations during the daytime
hours, so we conducted our research at night, on weekends, and during breaks, when these
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machines were available. Every evening, after classes ended, we ran twenty tasks stored in
the Windows Task Scheduler which opened various putty sessions. Each putty session
logged into a central on-campus server. The session also ran a remote login command
which created an SSH session with a lab computer and ran a script which started the
rcracki_mt software on a unique set of hashes to crack. Appendix B contains the entire bash
script which starts new cracking sessions, resumes existing cracking sessions, and ensures
that the cracking session ends at 7:50am, to prevent from interfering with normal operations
of the lab.
After completing the rainbow cracking exploit, we removed the hashes of cracked
passwords from the straight SHA1 hash list and began cracking passwords using John the
Ripper (JtR) [27] on a single desktop computer with Backtrack 5. We installed a patch to
JtR called “JtR-Jumbo-5-LinkedIn-SHA1.diff”. This patch adds a format which can be
specified at the command line to crack both traditional SHA1 hashes and the leading zeros
hashes found in the LinkedIn PVD file. We performed an initial crack of all passwords
using the “all.lst” wordlist from openwall.com [27]. A Google search for additional
dictionaries found the cracked passwords from the RockYou! security breach, foreign word
dictionaries, and medical term wordlists. Then we ran dictionary attacks on each of the
wordlists downloaded from the internet. In addition to these attacks, we also applied
various default mangling rules found in the john.config file. For more mangling options, we
downloaded and used rules from Kore Logic Security [28].
In comparing the cracked password results from the two lists, duplicate values began
to emerge. Although we performed a duplicates search on the lists individually, a duplicate
search between the lists was not performed. For the benefit of future studies and to
accurately reflect the percentage of passwords found, we copied the original list of straight
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SHA1 hashes, replaced the first five digits with zeros, and searched for duplicates. This
search produced 670,781 redundant values between the two lists leaving a total of 5,787,239
hashes between the two lists. Of the passwords cracked we found 54,916 duplicates existed
in the two cracked password lists. We removed these passwords from the leading zero
passwords cracked list.
Our work cracking straight SHA1 hashes revealed 78,720 passwords through
rainbow table cracking and 211,049 passwords through JtR with mangling rules. We
uncovered 2,442,874 passwords in the zero leading hash list using JtR with mangling rules.
These totals produce a combined sum of 2,732,643 cracked passwords or 47.22% of the
entire PVD file with duplicates removed.
It is important to note that, of the significant research in the field of password
analysis which we outlined in Chapter 2 and produced in Table 9: Password cracking history,
our study provides the largest number of cracked passwords analyzed. The passwords in the
RockYou! and the Yahoo! datasets contain more passwords, but neither of these datasets
require password cracking. The RockYou! dataset originated from an SQL injection exploit
which produced the 32 million account names and passwords in clear text. The Yahoo!
password dataset of approximately 70 million passwords resulted from a cooperative effort
between Bonneau, the author of the study, and Yahoo!, the web portal providing the data.
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Chapter 4
Analysis of LinkedIn Passwords
No single, commonly agreed upon methodology exists for password analysis.
Although many studies rely on length and composition metrics, the methods in which they
are applied are as numerous as the studies themselves. Guessing metrics provide a
consistent alternative to length and composition analysis, but relatively little password
research with real data has been done using any single guessing metric. The NIST metric for
measuring password complexity has also been used infrequently, because the definition of
the term entropy is not consistent with the definition known to most researchers in the field.
To perform analysis on the LinkedIn dataset, we chose to use length and
composition metrics. We will also calculate the NIST entropy value of the passwords
recovered to measure their complexity. We will proceed with the understanding that these
metrics measures password complexity, but fail to measure the level of difficulty that an
attacker would have breaking into the account. For example a password like Button123!
would have the complexity to pass most authentication requirements, but a simple mangling
rule would make this password easy prey for a standard dictionary attack. We chose not to
use guessing metrics in our analysis because the LinkedIn dataset contains unique hashes. In
order to work with guessing metrics, each hash in the dataset must have a probability
distribution over the entire set of possibilities.
In order to gauge the level of complexity of LinkedIn passwords, we will compare
the passwords revealed through our work with length and patterns in character composition
found in Weir’s analysis of the RockYou! dataset [5]. Since RockYou! builds social media
games and advertising products for sites, like Facebook, MySpace, and Friendster, we expect
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to find less complex and less random authentication strings than the password on LinkedIn
which presents professionals to a network of other professionals online.
Password Information
To begin our analysis, we will identify the length and character type composition of
passwords from the two datasets. Weir generated a table which captures passwords greater
than various lengths beginning with seven characters. His findings appear in Table 1:
Password Information with our results added for comparison.
Character 7+ Chars

Table 1: Password Information
8+ Chars
9+ Chars

10+ Chars

Set
Contains
RY!

LI

RY!

LI

RY!

LI

RY!

LI

Digits

57.5%

74.2%

59.5%

76.1%

60.2%

78.3%

60.0%

79.0%

Special

4.4%

5.6%

5.1%

6.6%

6.6%

10.3%

8.0%

11.7%

Uppercase

6.5%

19.1%

6.7%

19.8%

6.9%

25.0%

7.1%

26.5%

Only

89.2%

50.9%

88.4%

51.5%

86.7%

49.8%

85.1%

48.3%

Characters

Lowercase
Letters,
Digits

Weir found that as passwords grew in length the percentage of digits, special
characters, and uppercase letters also increased. The LinkedIn dataset echoes this trend.
The percentage of digits, special characters and uppercase letters in the LinkedIn passwords
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not only grew, but also surpassed the RockYou! dataset for each password length as shown
in Figure 1: Password Information.
Figure 1: Password Information
100.00%
90.00%

80.00%
70.00%
60.00%
50.00%
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%

RockYou!

10.00%

LinkedIn

0.00%

The only category where the RockYou! dataset surpasses LinkedIn is the Lowercase
Letters and Digits. Studies have shown that the most common passwords are also the
easiest to type and contain only lowercase letters [1] [2] [13] . In some studies, easy to type
passwords, which include only lowercase letters and numbers, account for over 50% of the
passwords [1] [29]. Other studies show this number much higher; exceeding 80% [2] [13]
[14]. The RockYou! dataset not only exceeds the LinkedIn dataset in these easier to type
passwords at every length, but also exceeds the LinkedIn dataset by a significant amount
(36.80-38.30%).
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Digits
Users frequently add numeric characters to passwords. This practice increases the
complexity of the password by expanding the key space and strengthening the security of the
authentication system. A password which contains only lowercase characters of the
alphabet possesses a key space of 26L, where L is the length of the password. When upper
case characters are added, the key space increases to 52L. The key space grows to 62L, if
digits are introduced to the uppercase and lowercase letters.
Of the 2,160,956 passwords cracked with seven or more characters, our study
produced 1,603,813 passwords with digits (74.21%). This is much higher than the 26%
found by Wu and 31.7% found by Spafford [29], but not quite as high as the 81% found by
Schneier [4]. Weir does not provide a percentage of passwords which contain digits. Instead
his study approaches the use of digits by analyzing the most frequently used number strings
and the placement of numbers within a password.
Table 2: Top Ten Digits shows the detailed results of Weir’s study of frequently

used number strings. We added our findings on a random sample of 100,000 passwords
with digits.

Table 2: Top Ten Digits
RY! Percentage
LI Digit

Rank

RY! Digit

LI Percentage

1

1

10.98%

1

10.07%

2

2

2.79%

2

3.01%

3

123

2.29%

3

2.60%

4

4

2.10%

0

2.27%

5

3

2.02%

4

2.03%

6

123456

1.74%

123

1.99%
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Rank

RY! Digit

RY! Percentage

LI Digit

LI Percentage

7

12

1.49%

01

1.54%

8

7

1.20%

12

1.49%

9

13

1.07%

7

1.28%

10

5

1.04%

5

1.26%

The results for this analysis demonstrate that users rarely choose digits randomly. In
the two top ten lists, eight of the ten values are shared: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12, and 123. Weir
discovered that 26.72% of the digits used appear in the top ten list. Our study closely
mirrors the RockYou! dataset with 27.54% of the total digits used appearing in the top ten
list.
Studies by Schneier [4], Devillers [2], and Wu [14] recognize the popularity of the
number one. Both our study and Weir’s analysis place the number one in the top position in
number rankings. The number one not only holds the top position in the Weir study, but
five of the items in Weir’s top ten list also contain a one. Digits containing a one comprise
20% of the total passwords with digits. Our top ten list also places one in the top position
with 10.07% of the total which is slightly lower than Weir found. The number one appears
as one of the digits in three other values in our top ten list, 123, 01, and 12. In total, the
number one appears in 15.09% of the top ten list for the LinkedIn sample. With respect to
the most popular digits found, numbers in the passwords from the LinkedIn dataset are less
predictable than the numbers found in the RockYou! dataset.
To fully understand the use of digits in a password, consideration must also be given
to where the digits in a password appear. Common patterns in digit placement indicate a
lower level of security than random placement. A comparison of passwords in Weir’s
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RockYou! dataset and the LinkedIn dataset appear in Table 3: How Digits are used in 7+
Character Passwords and Figure 2: How Digits are used in 7+ Character Passwords.

Location

Table 3: How Digits are used in 7+ Character Passwords
Example
RockYou!
LinkedIn

All Digits

1234567

20.51%

6.08%

After

password123

64.28%

74.89%

Before

123password

5.95%

8.62%

Other

passw0rd, pass123word, p1a2ssword, …

9.24%

10.40%

Figure 2: How Digits are used in 7+ Character Passwords
RockYou!

LinkedIn
6.08%
10.40%

9.24%
5.95%

20.51%

8.62%

74.89%

64.28%

All Digits

After

Before

Other

All Digits

After

Before

Other

As described previously, passwords which contain only digits use a smaller key space
and provide less security than passwords of the same length with both numbers and letters.
The RockYou! dataset triples LinkedIn with respect to digit only passwords. Several studies
[1], [2], [4], [14] [19] mention another common pattern of simply prepending or appending
digits to an alphabetic string of characters. In this regard, the LinkedIn password set has a
greater percentage than RockYou!. When LinkedIn users type numeric digits, 83.51% of
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these passwords prepend and append digits to alphabetic characters as opposed to the
70.23% by RockYou! users.
The most uncommon location where digits will be found is in the middle of a
password. Only a slight 1.16% difference exists between the LinkedIn and RockYou!
datasets. For passwords which contain digits, LinkedIn passwords possess numbers in the
middle of the password 10.40% of the time, while RockYou! passwords contain numbers in
the middle 9.24% of the time.
Uppercase Characters
As with adding digits to a password, the addition of uppercase characters increases
the size of the key space which, in turn, makes a password more secure. Like with digits,
password security depends not only on the existence of uppercase characters to expand the
key space, but also on placement of these characters in unpredictable locations within
passwords. Users frequently incorporate capital letters in passwords by typing all capital
letters or by typing an initial capital letter followed by all lower case letters [1] [19]. Weir
noticed that these two capitalization patterns account for almost 90% of all passwords in the
RockYou! dataset which contain an uppercase character. The composition of 7 character
passwords which include at least one uppercase character appear in Table 4: Top Ten Case
Mangling Rules for 7 characters and Figure 3: Top Ten Case Mangling Rules for 7
characters. The LinkedIn dataset appears to the right of the totals from the Weir study for

comparison.
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Rank

Table 4: Top Ten Case Mangling Rules for 7 characters
RockYou! String:
RockYou! Probability LinkedIn String
LinkedIn Probability

1

UUUUUUU

53.56%

ULLLLNN

12.10%

2

ULLLLLL

35.69%

ULLLLLL

12.00%

3

ULLLULL

1.05%

ULLLLLN

9.94%

4

LLLLLLL

1.03%

UUUUUUU

4.90%

5

ULLLLLU

0.90%

ULLNNNN

3.03%

6

ULLULLL

0.85%

UUUNNNN

2.48%

7

ULULULU

0.68%

ULLLNNN

2.43%

8

LLLLLLU

0.62%

UUUUUNN

1.57%

9

UULLLLL

0.61%

ULLNLLL

1.13%

10

UUULLLL

0.59%

UUUUUUN

1.07%

Figure 3: Top Ten Case Mangling Rules for 7 characters
RockYou!

LinkedIn

4.90%

6.33%
9.94%

35.69%

4.42%

12.00%
12.10%

ULLLLLL

Other top ten
Not in top ten

ULLLLNN
ULLLLLL

UUUUUUU
53.56%

3.77%

57.29%

ULLLLLN
UUUUUUU
Other top ten
Not in top ten

In the RockYou! dataset, all uppercase passwords account for 53.56% of the total
number of passwords while the single uppercase character followed by all lowercase
characters comprise another 35.69%. For an attacker aiming to exploit the easiest targets,
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applying mangling rules with only these two variations would crack almost nine out of ten
vulnerable passwords with capital letters.
The LinkedIn dataset produced 477,945 passwords with at least one uppercase
character (17.49%). In comparison, to Weir’s results, the LinkedIn passwords provided a
greater degree of security. The top ten mangling patterns for LinkedIn account for only
about 50% of all passwords. The two most common patterns, all uppercase and first letter
uppercase follow by lowercase letters, rank fourth and second respectively in the LinkedIn
list and contribute only 16.90% to the number of passwords with a capital letter. To
approach the 90% that the first two mangling rules cover in the RockYou! dataset, an
attacker would need to apply 359 different mangling rules with uppercase characters to the
LinkedIn dataset.
The Weir study determined that passwords which contain at least one uppercase
letter had a higher probability of having at least one digit or special character. Our analysis
of the LinkedIn dataset produced similar results as shown in Table 5: Comparison of
Lowercase v. Uppercase and
Figure 4: Comparison of Lowercase v. Uppercase.
Metric

Table 5: Comparison of Lowercase v. Uppercase
RockYou!: No
LinkedIn: No
RockYou!: Only

LinkedIn: Only

Uppercase

Uppercase

Passwords that

Passwords that

Characters

Characters

Contained an

Contained an

Uppercase

Uppercase

Average Length

7.86 characters

7.75 characters

8.28 characters

8.21 characters

% that Contained

53.93%

69.94%

55.74%

82.68%

3.15%

2.96%

7.87%

13.18%

a Digit
% that Contained
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a Special Char
Figure 4: Comparison of Lowercase v. Uppercase
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Only
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Contained an Contained an
Uppercase Uppercase
Average Length
% that Contained a Digit
% that Contained a Special Char

A significant difference exists between the two datasets in the digit and special
character category. In the RockYou! dataset, Weir observed only a 1.81% difference
between passwords with at least a single uppercase character and passwords without an
uppercase character. The difference observed in the LinkedIn dataset was 12.74%. In the
category of at least one uppercase character and at least one special character, Weir’s dataset
started slightly higher (3.15% ) for passwords without uppercase characters than the
LinkedIn dataset (2.96%). However, the RockYou! dataset only grew to 7.87% in this
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category, while the LinkedIn dataset more than quadrupled in size (13.18%) to surpass
RockYou!.
Special Characters
We will conclude our analysis of character sets by identifying habits and patterns of
users when they construct passwords which contain special characters. Of the 2,732,643
LinkedIn passwords cracked, 129,744 passwords (4.75%) contain at least one special
character. As we discovered with numbers, users rarely choose special characters randomly.
Our study revealed that of the thirty-three special characters, 90.72% of the passwords
which contain a single letter special characters appear in the top ten ranking. Weir
discovered that a similarly high number (85.34%) of single letter special characters in the
RockYou! dataset appear in the top ten ranking. The results of both studies appear in Table
6: Top Ten One Letter Special Characters.

Table 6: Top Ten One Letter Special Characters
RockYou!:
RockYou!:
LinkedIn:

Rank

Special Character

Probability

Special Character

LinkedIn:
Probability

1

.

17.81%

!

24.08%

2

_

14.72%

@

17.93%

3

!

11.34%

#

10.46%

4

-

10.25%

$

8.18%

5

<space>

8.72%

.

7.98%

6

@

7.19%

*

7.43%

7

*

6.54%

_

6.35%
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Rank

RockYou!:

RockYou!:

LinkedIn:

LinkedIn:

Special Character

Probability

Special Character

Probability

8

#

3.92%

-

5.16%

9

/

3.01%

%

1.60%

10

&

1.84%

&

1.55%

As with the study of digits, these two datasets share eight of the top ten special characters:
exclamation point (!), underscore ( _), period (.), commercial at(@), hyphen(-), asterisk (*),
pound (#), and ampersand (&). These eight characters represent 73.61% of the one letter
special character passwords in the RockYou! dataset which Weir studied and 80.94% of the
LinkedIn passwords which we revealed. In terms of key space, the attacker would be able to
reduce the amount of work required in a brute force attack by searching only one quarter of
the special characters for a return of approximately 75% of the passwords with one special
character.
To better understand how a user constructs passwords which contain special
characters, Table 7: Top Ten Structures for Special Characters identifies the placement of
special characters in seven character passwords.

Rank

Table 7: Top Ten Structures for Special Characters
A=Alpha, D=Digit, S=Special
RockYou!
RockYou!:
LinkedIn:
LinkedIn:
Structure

Probability

Structure

Probability

1

AAAAAAS

28.50%

AAAAASD

13.60%

2

AAASAAA

7.87%

AAAASDD

13.22%

3

AAAASDD

6.32%

AAAAAAS

11.95%

4

AAAAASD

6.18%

AAAADDS

6.25%
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Rank

RockYou!

RockYou!:

LinkedIn:

LinkedIn:

Structure

Probability

Structure

Probability

5

AASAAAA

3.43%

AAAAADS

6.12%

6

AAAASAA

2.76%

AAASDDD

5.38%

7

AAAAASA

2.64%

AAADDDS

4.81%

8

SAAAAAS

2.50%

AAASAAA

3.86%

9

ASAAAAA

2.38%

AAAASAA

2.13%

10

AAAAASS

2.17%

AADDDDS

1.61%

Again we observe overlap in the lists. Five character patterns appear in both the RockYou!
and the LinkedIn dataset: AAAAAAS, AAASAAA, AAAASDD, AAAAASD, and
AAAASAA. The pattern of appending a single special character to the end of an alphabetic
string holds the top ranking in the RockYou! dataset with 28.50% of the passwords with
special character passwords using that pattern. At 13.60%, the top ranking item in the
LinkedIn list is less than half of the top ranking item for RockYou!. For passwords with
special characters, the top ten list comprises 64.75% of all patterns for the RockYou! dataset
and 68.93% of all patterns for the LinkedIn dataset. As shown in Table 1: Password
Information, the LinkedIn dataset contains a higher percentage of passwords with special

characters than the RockYou! dataset. However, users generally chose the same characters
and add them in a predictable manner making their use less effective from a security
perspective than if they had been applied in a less conventional manner.
Analysis summary
Since numbers, uppercase characters, and special characters expand the key space
and add to the complexity of a password, we studied each of these character types to better
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understand whether RockYou! users or LinkedIn users made more secure password choices.
In both the RockYou! and LinkedIn password lists, we found that as the length of the
password increases the percentage of digits, uppercase characters, and special characters also
increase. We noticed that the use of common numbers was consistent between the two
password lists with eight of the top ten digits shared between the lists. When digits
appeared, the RockYou! dataset used them more predictably and less securely with three
times the number of all digit passwords than the LinkedIn dataset. We discovered that the
use of uppercase characters was more prevalent in the LinkedIn dataset and more secure.
When uppercase characters were used in the RockYou! dataset, almost 90% of the
passwords containing uppercase characters utilized only two patterns: all uppercase letters
and a first character uppercase followed by all lowercase characters. In comparison, the top
two patterns for LinkedIn account for only 24.10% of the total number of passwords with
capital letters. Special characters appeared more frequently in the LinkedIn dataset also.
The LinkedIn users chose more predictable special characters and used them in common
patterns more frequently than RockYou! users.
NIST
Next we calculated the password entropy as defined in the NIST 800-63-1 Electronic
Authentication Guidelines [30]. NIST entropy provides a measurement system for rating a
password’s complexity based on the attributes of length and character composition. It
should be made clear that we will not use Shannon’s definition of entropy which is the default
definition of the term in the field of information theory. Verhuel [31] and Massey [32]
question the effectiveness of applying Shannon’s entropy calculations to evaluate password
strength, and Weir [5] proves that entropy fails to measure the effectiveness of password
creation rules. We will also not use the NIST entropy score to gauge the password’s
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resistance to an attack. Instead, we calculated entropy in this study to measure the
complexity of the two datasets and to compare the results.
Up to this point, we have included passwords with foreign letters and other
characters in our analysis because they also contain characters from the uppercase,
lowercase, number and special character sets found in Table 10: Character Set for Entropy
Calculations. For a more concise calculation of entropy on the LinkedIn dataset, the 328

passwords with a character outside of the 95 letter character set appearing in will be omitted.
The NIST standard calculates password entropy using the following criteria:
1. Assign the first character 4 bits.
2. Assign characters two through eight 2 bits each.
3. Assign characters nine through twenty 1.5 bits each.
4. Assign characters greater than twenty 1 bit.
5. Add 6 bits for both upper case and non-alphabetic characters.
6. Add 6 bits for an extensive dictionary check.
The LinkedIn dataset contains no passwords with less than six characters. For this reason,
the minimum entropy of the dataset begins at 14, and 522,186 passwords possess this value.
The maximum entropy value of 48 belongs to two passwords: “Thequickbrownfox666.” and
“Supercal1frag1l1st1c”. We calculated the average number of entropy bits in the LinkedIn
passwords cracked to be 18.95. In comparison Weir observed passwords with entropy
values in the range of 4 to 32. Weir does not provide an average entropy calculation on the
RockYou! dataset.
Table 8: LinkedIn Totals based on NIST Guidelines displays the total number of

passwords which meet each category for calculating entropy. Table 11: LinkedIn Entropy
Totals in the Appendix C provides calculations for arriving at the average.
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Table 8: LinkedIn Totals based on NIST Guidelines

Character length No uppercase
or dictionary
bonus

Number of
passwords
which contain
uppercase and
either a special
character or
number

Number of
passwords
which receive
dictionary bonus
only

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

26277
38655
97138
52442
31936
13804
6191
2170
779
206
75
4
1
1

7916
28019
70982
21280
15440
7461
4432
1682
885
302
302
9
13
3
3
2
2
1

522186
460506
722772
241420
140298
50858
22545
7827
3154
1027
485
30
9
6
4

Number of
passwords
which contain
uppercase and
either a special
character or
number and
receive
dictionary bonus
15308
34812
35354
18268
13198
7096
3771
1776
737
264
149
17
8
2
2
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Chapter5
Conclusion
Text based passwords dominate all other forms of authentication. Their popularity
stems from the cost effective means that they provide for controlling access to a system.
Despite this widespread use, the choices that human beings must make to create memorable
passwords limit the level of security that password authentication can possess. Our study
echoes the findings of previous research which proves that users frequently select easy to
remember and type passwords which provide more security than the password creation rules
require, but fail to provide enough security to deter an attacker. In this thesis we first
recovered 2,732,643 plaintext passwords from the SHA1 hashed LinkedIn Password
Verification Data file. Using open source password cracking tools, we uncovered 47% of
the passwords in the LinkedIn dataset.
Next we analyzed the passwords and compared our results with the RockYou!
passwords that Weir studied to discover that the passwords used to authenticate users on the
professional social media site LinkedIn provides slightly better security than the passwords
which authenticate users of social media RockYou! games. We found that LinkedIn
passwords contained a greater percentage of numbers, special characters, and uppercase
letters than RockYou!. We discovered fewer all digit passwords which have a relatively small
key space. The LinkedIn dataset also possessed greater complexity when uppercase letters
appeared in passwords. Although special characters appeared more frequently in the
LinkedIn dataset, the RockYou! dataset demonstrated a higher level of complexity than
LinkedIn with respect to one letter special character usage. Lastly we found that the entropy
based on the NIST 800-63-1 Electronic Authentication Guidelines started and ended higher
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for LinkedIn passwords than RockYou!. The lack of data with respect to average entropy in
the Weir study prevents a direct comparison of this metric.
Areas of Further Research
The hashes cracked and analyzed in our study possess two significant differences
with the dataset used in the Weir study of RockYou! passwords. The password lists were
obtained in completely different manners, and the password lists contain differences with
respect to the existence of duplicate values.
An attacker exploited the RockYou! authentication system using a SQL injection
attack. This type of exploit allowed the Weir study to randomly shuffle and analyze groups
of plaintext passwords from the entire RockYou! list. The LinkedIn dataset appeared on a
Russian hacking website hashed. Through our efforts we obtained only about half of the
passwords, and these passwords represent the easiest to crack. Although we have proven
that the LinkedIn list contains greater complexity with respect to length, character
composition, and NIST entropy average, we cannot prove the true difference between the
datasets, because the most complex, hashed, LinkedIn passwords cannot be used in our
analysis.
The RockYou! dataset studied by Weir contains over 32 million plaintext passwords.
In this list we identified 14,344,386 unique passwords. Of this list 2,459,759 passwords
appeared more than once. Although duplicates appeared in the LinkedIn list, the list of
zero-leading hashes is unique and the list of straight SHA1 hashes is unique. The duplication
between lists occurred when we replaced the first five characters of the straight SHA1
hashes with zeroes and searched for duplicates in the zero-leading hashes. Since each
duplicates only appeared one time, it seems that duplication resulted from copying hashes
between lists and not moving hashes between lists.
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For future research, we would recommend cracking a greater percentage of LinkedIn
hashes to better understand the password choices made on the professional social media site.
We would also recommend performing an independent study of unique RockYou!
passwords, rather than using results which contain duplicates from the Weir study. As an
alternative if a dataset from a personal social media site, like Facebook or Google+, became
available, analyzing and comparing unique passwords would provide a better understand of
the choices that users make when protecting different types of social media accounts.
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Table 9: Password cracking history
Name
Year Passwords

Appendix A
Number (%)
Cracked
2381
(86%)
3340
(24.2%)

Morris,
Thompson
Klein

1978

3289

1990

13797

Spafford

1992

19100

13787
(72.18%)

Wu

1999

slightly over
25,000

2045
(approximate
ly 8.18%)

Kuo

2004

144

4%

Narayanan,
Shmatikov

2005

142

67.6

Schneier
Dell Amico,
Michiardi,
Roudier
Weir,
Aggarwal,
Collins
Stern
Devillers
Bonneau

2006
2010

N/A

2010

34000
Italian 9317
Finish 15,812
My Space 33,671
32 M

2010
2012

32M
70M

Source

Obtained

Cracking Method

Unknown

“gathered from many users over a long
period of time”
Voluntary solicitation of friends

Dictionary

collection software installed on
machines

Dictionary

collected from authentication server

Dictionary and
simple mangling

Voluntary solicitation from craigslist and
student-hosted bulletin board
provided by Passware

Dictionary, Mangling,
BruteForce
Dictionary –
modified version of
Markovian filter
Rainbow
N/A
Dictionary, mangling,
Markov chains

Survey requesting
/etc/passwd file on
Unix machines
54 machines in the
Department of
Computer Sciences and
Computing Center
authentication server of
a large
Kerberos realm,
serving over 25,000
users
Survey Participants to
Craigslist ad
Passware

N/A

MySpace
three: Italian IM server
Finnish web Forum
MySpace 2006
Rock You!

Phishing attack
Italian?
Finnish – publicly disclosed,
My space - phishing
SQL injection attack (unencrypted)

N/A
N/A

RockYou!
Yahoo!

SQL injection attack
Cooperation of web portal

Dictionary, Mangling

N/A

N/A
N/A
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Appendix B
#!/bin/bash
#bash script to create an ssh connection and
#run rcracki_mt between 4:00pm and 7:50am
#if a previous session exists for the crack
#it will resume. Otherwise a new session will
#be started.
#k Gives hour M gives minute 10:30 is 1030
time="date +%k%M"
InFile="$HOME/HashInputFiles/Hashesupto915000x5k.txt"
SesFile=Hashesupto915k
SessionFile="$HOME/Hashesupto915k.session"
OutFile="$HOME/HashOutputFiles/passListupto0915000x5k.out"

#create ssh connection and run rainbow crack
#if a previous session does not exist start new session otherwise
resume previous session
if [ ! -f ${SessionFile} ]; then
echo "142 File not found..."
if [ ! -f ${OutFile} ]; then
echo "142 New Session!"
./rcracki_mt -l ${InFile} -s ${SesFile} -t 8 -o ${SessionFile}
~/RT_Files &
else
echo "142 Execution Complete!" >> runCracks.out
sleep 10h
exit
fi
else
echo "142 File found - resume existing sessions!"
./rcracki_mt -l ${InFile} -r -s ${SesFile} -t 8 -o
${SessionFile} ~/RT_Files &
fi

#get the pid of the ssh connection which was just created
pid=$(pgrep -u quinnmj ssh -n)
echo "PID = $pid"
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#If the time is between 4pm and 11:59pm or 12:00am and 7:50am
continue running script otherwise exit script
intimerange="1"
while [ $intimerange -eq 1 ]; do
if ([[ $(eval "$time") -ge 1600 ]] && [[ $(eval "$time") -le 2359
]]) || ([[ $(eval "$time") -ge 000 ]] && [[ $(eval "$time") -le 750
]]);then
echo "Running at `date +%D%t%T`."
sleep 10m # Use sleep 10m
else
intimerange=0
fi
done
#kill ssh connection
kill -9 $pid
echo "Exiting at `date +%D%t%T`."
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Appendix C

A

Table 10: Character Set for Entropy Calculations
N
a
n
0
@
\

>

B

O

b

o

1

#

|

,

C

P

c

p

2

$

]

<

D

Q

d

q

3

%

}

Space

E

R

e

r

4

^

[

F

S

f

s

5

&

{

G

T

g

t

6

*

‘

H

U

h

u

7

(

“

I

V

i

v

8

)

;

J

W

j

w

9

-

:

K

X

k

x

~

_

/

L

Y

l

y

`

=

?

M

Z

m

z

!

+

.
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Appendix C

Character

No uppercase

Total bits no

Table 11: LinkedIn Entropy Totals
Uppercase but Total bits
No

Total bits

Both

Total bits

length

or dictionary

uppercase or

no dictionary

Uppercase

uppercase

uppercase but

uppercase and

Both

bonus

dictionary

bonus

no

but

dictionary

dictionary

uppercase and

dictionary

dictionary

bonus

bonus

dictionary

bonus

bonus

bonus

bonus

6

522186

7310604

26277

525540

7916

158320

15308

398008

7

460506

7368096

38655

850410

28019

616418

34812

974736

8

722772

13009896

97138

2331312

70982

1703568

35354

1060620

9

241420

4707690

52442

1337271

21280

542640

18268

575442

10

140298

2946258

31936

862272

15440

416880

13198

435534

11

50858

1144305

13804

393414

7461

212638.5

7096

244812

12

22545

541080

6191

185730

4432

132960

3771

135756

13

7827

199588.5

2170

68355

1682

52983

1776

66600

14

3154

85158

779

25707

885

29205

737

28743

15

1027

29269.5

206

7107

302

10419

264

10692
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Character

No uppercase

Total bits no

Uppercase but

Total bits

No

Total bits

Both

Total bits

length

or dictionary

uppercase or

no dictionary

Uppercase

uppercase

uppercase but

uppercase and

Both

bonus

dictionary

bonus

no

but

dictionary

dictionary

uppercase and

dictionary

dictionary

bonus

bonus

dictionary

bonus

bonus

bonus

bonus

16

485

14550

75

2700

302

10872

149

6258

17

30

945

4

150

9

337.5

17

739.5

18

9

297

1

39

13

507

8

360

19

6

207

1

40.5

3

121.5

2

93

20

4

144

3

126

2

96

21

2

86

22

2

88

23

1

45

Total bits
Total passwords
Average bits

51774839.5
2732302
18.94916429
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